CSP and Petri Nets are powerful formalisms for the specification and the analysis of concurrent systems. We present an approach to their integration to take advantage of both formalisms. In particular the GSPN class is used to address dependability and real-time aspects. In this paper an algorithmic transformation from a trace-based specification of a concurrent system to a Petri Net model is described. Causal dependencies between behaviours of the system components are introduced in the net model through the definition of external assumptions. The steps of the integration are illustrated by applying them to an unmanned transportation problem.
INTRODUCTION
Formal specification is a very important step in the design of concurrent software systems with dependability requirements.
In particular, the availability of an unambiguous and executable specification often assumes a fundamental importance as it allows a formal verification and also enables simulation of the system.
The process of developing such a specification is very expensive for most real problems, as it requires time and designers' expertise. In industrial environments, this effort is justified by the need to have a high level of confidence in the system behaviour, especially under critical conditions, and to validate its design. In developing concurrent realtime software, for instance, it is recognized that 'more time is spent in design and analysis, to enhance reliability and safety' [1] . However, methodologies are needed to ease the production of a formal specification for such a class of dependable applications.
Our work addresses the goal of integrating two different specification techniques by defining a systematic approach to the construction of a (stochastic) Petri Net (PN) model of a dependable concurrent system. The aim is to obtain a specification of a system that allows us: (a) to gain all the advantages of an operational semantic (PN); (b) to pass through a semi-formal and intuitive notation (states and events) easy to understand and use; (c) to enable a rigorous and automatable definition of the process behaviours.
The approach starts from an informal description of the system and uses a trace-based specification as the intermediate semi-formal step between the informal description and the operational specifications realized by the PN formalism.
In order to satisfy point (c), we found the construction of the traces on the Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) theory.
The final model allows a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the system, making possible measurements concerning dependability aspects, such as reliability and safety. As it is an executable specification, the net model can also be used to simulate the system's dynamic behaviour.
Besides representing a systematic approach to the construction of a PN model of the system, the proposed method can be automated to a large extent, thus hiding from the software engineer many technical details of moving from the trace-based domain to the operational PN domain. This paper is specifically focused on the core of the method, that is the algorithmic transformation of the tracebased specifications into a PN, and shows its application to a non-trivial case study, namely an unmanned transportation system with an anti-collision protection system. The PN model is then transformed into a Generalized Stochastic Petri Net (GSPN) [2] model which is used to evaluate the probability of an unsafe state under the assumption of a failure of the anti-collision antenna. The reader can refer to [3, 4, 5] for a more detailed description of the overall specification and analysis approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give an overview of related work. Section 3 gives an informal description of the method; in Section 4, after introducing some basic notation, we concentrate on the definition of the rules for the transformation from the trace-based domain to the PN domain. Section 5 shows how logical and timing requirements are introduced into 146 A. MAZZEO et al. the model and in Section 6 we apply the method to the unmanned transportation problem.
RELATED WORK
The role of PNs and CSP in the specification and analysis of concurrent systems has been widely investigated. Petri Net semantics for CSP have been provided following two major research lines: languages and formalisms.
Along the first line are methods and techniques to translate programs into PN models. One of the first papers translating CSP programs to PNs was [6] . Here a subset of the CSP language is considered, which assumes distributed termination but does not allow the nesting of parallel commands. In [7] a translation method is presented from programs written in a CSP-like language to a subclass of Predicate/Transition nets with individual tokens, where neither nesting of parallel commands is allowed or distributed termination is addressed, but actions which are causally dependent on each other can be considered. Examples of other papers in this area are [8] , which states a distributed operational semantics for full CSP and, more recently, [9, 10] .
The last two works also address timing aspects in order to perform real-time analysis and performance evaluation. In [9] the author states a set of rules to translate a CSP subset (no recursion is allowed) to PNs with deterministic timing. In this paper the minimal execution time problem (terminating processes) and the minimal cycle time problem (cyclic processes) are studied as to strong NP-hardness, and limits are found under which a polynomial algorithm exists.
In [10] a methodology is described for the analysis of concurrent programs written in a CSP-like language, based on a translation technique from programs to GSPNs.
Along the second line of research some work was made in the field of trace theory and process algebra. In [11] Elementary Net (EN) representations are built for activities with arbitrary behaviour given by a certain set of traces. In [12] a stochastic PN semantics for a stochastic process algebra is provided and evaluated over concurrency, retrievability and Markovian equivalence.
Here we present an approach which belongs to this last line of research: its aim is not to translate programs to the PN model, but to give a practical and engineering meaning to system specification and early analysis starting from a trace-based representation of the behaviour of the system, according to a subset of the Hoare's theory. This allows us to produce an 'easy' and intuitive description of the system in terms of traces and meanwhile it also provides a systematic basis to derive a PN representation, since traces describe behaviours which are rigorously defined through CSP theory. Timing aspects are also taken into account. Attention is paid to the compositionality of the approach: the overall model is built by modelling the system components individually, and then putting them together by means of superposition. These features are described in the following sections.
Our work also has some contact points with respect to [13, 14, 15] which do not belong to the PN field. Sorensen et al. [13] show how to derive a Markov model for dependability analysis from a trace-based functional system description. As the method is based on the intermediate construction of a finite automation from a CSP process, it applies only to deterministic systems. As with their approach, our method yields (indirectly) a Markov model, which results from the transformation of the PN final model into a GSPN, if needed. Unlike their approach, however, our method is not restricted to deterministic systems and it is compositional. The constrained expressions formalism described by Avrunin et al. [14] is used to perform an algebraic analysis so as to determine whether a particular event, or sequence of events, appears in any possible system behaviour. This is done by first describing the event sequences for each component process, and then removing those interleavings that represent illegal or impossible behaviours. Our method differs from this approach because it directly generates only the feasible traces of a process from which it builds a PN model of the process. Finally, Tyrrell and Carpenter [15] investigate a CSP-based method which uses trace evaluation to identify atomic actions in the design of fault-tolerant concurrent systems and help the designer in defining fault tolerance mechanisms.
OVERVIEW OF THE METHOD
The main feature of the method is that a stochastic highlevel PN model of a concurrent system is built in a modular and systematic way, starting from a trace-based functional specification. The method allows the behaviour of each component (process) and their interactions to be specified separately in terms of the feasible sequences of events in which they can be involved [3] .
The steps are the following:
1. From the system functional requirements, expressed in the natural language, an informal description is derived, consisting of a list of the components and, for each one, a list of events, states and logical or timing constraints.
The interactions between components correspond to subsets of common events. 2. From these lists, a CSP specification in terms of traces is derived for each component. 3. The set of algebraic specifications is transformed into a set of equivalent PN representations. This is done according to proper algorithms and rules. 4. This step considers the interactions between processes.
The Petri subnets modelling the processes in isolation are integrated, yielding a skeleton of a stochastic net model of the system. Algorithmic rules are also applied to this purpose. 5. The PN skeleton is transformed into a complete stochastic net, by supplementing it with quantitative parameters. This step consists mainly of the assignment of rates to the timed transitions, according to the initial requirements provided in step 1. The PN shown in Figure 1 graphically illustrates the various steps. The net also highlights the correspondence between concepts belonging to different domains (informal description, CSP, PN).
The informal description (step 1) must provide all the information needed in the next phase to identify the CSP processes and their feasible traces (in the Hoare [16] sense). It contains a list of the components of the system, and for each component: In general, each set of events can also contain failure and repair events, i.e. it can contain events related to reliability and safety requirements. However, discussion of the introduction of failure/repair events goes beyond the main goal of this paper, which is to describe the transformation from CSP to PN.
A state is defined by identifying the events that cause the transition into it. Constraints are usually imposed on the sequences of events in which each component can be involved.
The temporal specifications consist of a list of the timeconsuming events and the associated temporal parameters. This list is used in the last phase to introduce time into the system model in a simple and natural way.
In step 2 a CSP process for each component is derived from the informal descriptions. In this step the definitions of the states of each process are expressed by means of logical predicates and the constraints by means of assumptions which are divided into two groups: internal assumptions come from precedence constraints between events, or logical constraints; external assumptions come from constraints involving events that belong to different sets (i.e. involving different components), and can include timing constraints. A set of rules is then applied (step 3) to transform each CSP specification into a PN subnet. The subnets are integrated and the external assumptions are introduced to obtain a complete PN, called PN skeleton, which is used for simulation and analysis (step 4).
Time is then introduced into the specification, thus completing the qualitative PN (step 5). This is accomplished in two phases. In the first one the PN skeleton is transformed into a (Generalized) Stochastic Petri Net; in the second phase, called the temporization phase, probabilities and firing rates are added to the model. Some restrictions are necessary on the system and its components in order to ensure that the trace specifications describe CSP processes and avoid the generation of infinite state spaces. They will be specified in the next section.
The application of the method is entirely illustrated with reference to the case study described in Section 6.
FROM CSP SPECIFICATIONS TO PETRI NETS
In this section we concentrate on the domain transformation process (steps 3 and 4). Hence, in the following we assume that the informal description of the system is given and also that the trace-based specifications of each component have been derived by formally expressing all the elements listed in Section 3.
The method works under some constraints:
(a) dynamic creation of processes is not allowed, but an exception is made for the case of recursion as will be described later; (b) sequential composition of more processes in conjunction with recursion is not possible; (c) the set of the different events in which the component can be involved is finite; (d) exactly one initial event is allowed for each component, but it can have more distinct final events; (e) the behaviour of each component is sequential: if a process performs parallel actions, this means that the related component must be further decomposed in more elementary sub-systems.
Note that non-deterministic behaviours are allowed and concurrency is introduced in the composition of the process nets into the PN skeleton of the system, as well as causality relations among events which are introduced through the external assumptions. This means that the system itself could not behave as a CSP process, but its single components modelled in isolation must. Indeed, the above restrictions ensure that the behaviours of the system components with which we deal, can be described by the trace sets of CSP processes and that they describe finite state space. In particular, constraint (b) is necessary since Hoare has shown that sequential composition used in conjunction with recursion can define a machine with an infinite number of states [16] . Nevertheless, to ensure that the PN skeleton also has a finite state space, we will also require that it is a k-bounded net. This implies that further constraints will be added in modelling data and iteration of events (Section 4) as well as in introducing external assumptions (Section 5).
Basic notations
Below we introduce some notation and definitions. The basic CSP standard notation used throughout the paper are summarized in the Appendix. 1 Let P be a terminating process, trace(P) its set of traces and End(P) the subset of α P defined as follows: 
where e1, e2, e3, e4 ∈ α P and End(P) = {e4}. P has one basic trace, namely e1, e2, e3, e4 .
DEFINITION 4.2. Trace closure of a process.
We call trace closure of P the set ∝trace(P) = {t ∈ trace(P)/t is a basic trace}.
Of course ∝trace(P) ⊆ trace(P). EXAMPLE 4.2. In Hoare's theory recursion describes a repetitive behaviour which is introduced through a selfreferential process definition. The trace set of a recursive process is formally given by:
where X is a process, F(X) is a guarded expression, A = α P and
is the recursive process which is the unique solution of the equation X = F(X). The process STOP A is defined in Subsection 4.2.
We divided recursive processes into two classes: bounded and unbounded.
An unbounded recursive process P has a non-terminating repetitive behaviour which is described by a non-finite set of traces.
Let P be an unbounded recursive process which repetitively engages only in the sequence of events e1, e2, . . . , e q . We denote its basic trace t as e1, e2, . . . , e q * . A bounded recursive process P is a recursive process whose set of traces describes a terminating repetitive behaviour.
Let P be a bounded recursive process which repetitively engages only in the sequence of events e1, e2, . . . , e q . We denote its basic trace t as e1, e2, . . . , e q n , where n is a positive natural number.
We will define two different translation rules for bounded and unbounded recursive processes.
Now we give a new definition of End(P).
Let P be a process and ∝trace(P) its trace closure set. End(P) is the subset of α P defined as follows:
End(P) = {e ∈ α P/e = t ∀t ∈ ∝trace(P)}. EXAMPLE 4.3. Let P be an unbounded recursive process and ∝trace(P) = { e1, e2 * } be its closure set. End(P) = {e2}.
DEFINITION 4.3. Homologous events. Let s and t be two basic traces of P. We call homologous events of s and t the pairs of events (e s , e t ) which correspond to each other by order in s and t.
EXAMPLE 4.4. Let s be e1, e2 and t be e1, e3, e2 where e1, e2, e3 ∈ α P. The following two pairs of homologous events are defined: (e1, e1) and (e2, e3). Since #s < #t the last event e2 of t is not homologous in s.
DEFINITION 4.4. Branching events. Let s and t be two (distinct) basic traces of P. We call branching events of s and t the homologous events
(e s , e t )/e s = e s (n + 1) = e t = e t (n + 1) and ∃n > 1 :
EXAMPLE 4.5. Let s be e1, e2, e3, e5 and t be e1, e2, e4, e5 , e1, . . . , e5 ∈ α P. The pair (e3, e4) is the pair of branching events for s and t. Note that n > 1 always, because the initial event is unique.
The trace closure set of each process is translated into an equivalent PN.
Subsequently, the subnets have to be integrated to represent all the possible behaviours of the concurrent system when the individual processes evolve simultaneously and interact with each other.
This phase can be automated by means of a 'tracecompiler' and a 'PN linker' which implement the transformation rules defined below. The rules are divided into two classes: translation rules and composition rules. The translation rules apply to the trace closure sets and they are implemented by the trace compiler to derive a Petriequivalent subnet from each process. The composition rules apply to the Petri-equivalent subnets and they are implemented by the PN linker to integrate the different subnets until the PN skeleton of the whole system is obtained.
The composition rules are based on Hoare's composition laws of concurrent processes which have been revised to preserve the identities of the processes involved. We call the result of the composition of two or more processes a compound process.
Translation rules
Rule 0. Basic element. The basic element of a trace is an event e. Its translation is shown in Figure 2 ; s1 and s2 are the input and output places of the basic element respectively and represent two different states of the process. The transition models the event e whose occurrence causes the transition from the state s1 to the state s2.
STOP and SKIP processes
We recall that STOP A is a process which never engages in any of the events of its alphabet A and SKIP A is a process which does nothing but terminates successfully, so that:
where √ is a special event denoting successful termination. √ is always made implicit in the following. STOP A models deadlocks or failures. The empty trace is simply represented by means of a sink place in the PN model, whereas √ is not made explicit in the PN representation of a process. This means that a leaf place models both a failure and a successful termination, depending on the process evolution (i.e. the related basic traces). Rule 1. Sequence. Let P be a non-recursive process so that ∝trace(P) = {t}, i.e. t is a finite sequence of events, not necessarily distinct, of α P from the initial event to a final event e ∈ End(P).
The formal expression for the trace set of this kind of process in the CSP theory is:
where e1 ∈ α P, α(e1 → P) = α P, and (e1 → P) is a process whose initial event is e1, then evolving like P.
The equivalent PN is a sequence of places and transitions. The related translation algorithm generates a sequence of places and transitions so that each transition represents one event of the trace, in the same order. 
Rule 2. Unbounded recursion.
Let P be a simple unbounded recursive process so that ∝trace(P) = {t}, i.e. t has the form e1, e2, . . . , e q * , where e1, e2, . . . , e q are q events, not necessarily distinct, of α P.
The translation of t is obtained as follows:
ALGORITHM 4.2.
1. Translate the finite sequence of events e1, e2, . . . , e q by means of Rule 1. 2. Delete the final place and its input arc. 3. Make the resulting PN cyclic by adding an output arc between the last transition and the initial place. Figure 4 shows the translation of the basic trace e1, e2 * . The bounded case is considered by Rule 4.
Rule 3. Choice. Let P be a process so that ∝trace(P) = {s, t} where s and t are sequences of events as in Rule 1. Suppose that there exists (e s , e t ), the pair of branching events of the two basic traces s and t of P respectively. From Definition 4.3 this means that there exists n > 1 so that e s(n) = e t (n) is a particular event, after which the process P evolves in one of two different ways. Formally, if B ⊆ α P and P(x) represents the process P as a function of its first event x ∈ B, the choice is expressed by: The trace set of this process is:
In general if ∝trace(P) contains m basic traces that are simple or recursive sequences, more choices can be nested, each one corresponding to a pair of branching events. The algorithm builds the equivalent PN by levels. A level is identified by pairs of branching events which have different positions in the basic traces. ALGORITHM 4.3.
1. The trace closure set is scanned in search of the (next) pair of homologous events. If such a pair exists then the following two steps are performed. 2. If there exists a simple sequence of events before the pair of homologous events Rule 1 is applied to it. 3. An alternative branch is generated for each homologous event. 4. Steps 1 to 3 are repeated for each branch. 5. The generated branches are terminated by applying Rule 1 to the remaining sequence of events (if any). 6. If two (or more) branches have a common final event, they are joined over it by superposing the related input places and the related input arcs. 7. Each subnet modelling an unbounded recursive basic trace (if any) is made cyclic, as in Rule 2. Figure 5 shows the equivalent PN obtained by applying Rule 3 to the process P whose trace closure is given by:
Rule 4. Iteration. Let P be a process so that ∝trace(P) consists of two basic trace s and t. t has the form e1, e2, . . . , e q n , i.e. the sequence of events e1, e2, . . . , e q is repeated a finite number of times n ≥ 0. Let e s be the event associated with the exit from the iteration and s = e1, e s (e s is the last event of An example of the application of Rule 4 is shown in Figure 6 where:
Note that the value of n is not determined. It depends on the occurrence of e s that is in conflict with e2. Indeed, if P is an iterative process, this means that the number of iterations to be performed is not determined, but it supposes a probabilistic choice. This is because we do not model data to avoid the state space explosion. Moreover, sometimes it is possible to model a finite value for a loop control variable by means of a place whose initial marking is its upper bound [10] .
Once the closure set of a process has been translated, the initial marking of the equivalent PN is defined by posing a token in the initial place of the net. The PN-equivalent representation of the process behaviour obtained by means of Rules 1 to 4 with the initial marking is a State Machine (SM) net with single token. This implies that the PNequivalent nets are safe [17] , i.e. they are 1-bounded as the maximum number of tokens in any place in any reachable marking is exactly one.
Composition rules
Rule 5. Sequential composition. Let P and Q be two sequential, non-recursive processes such that α P = α Q and let P have one unique feasible ending state. We recall that if s and t are traces and s does not contain √ their sequential composition is defined by [16] :
The sequential composition of P and Q is the compound process P; Q that first evolves as P and after the successful termination of P evolves as Q. Formally:
traces(P; Q) = {s; t/s ∈ traces(P)ˆt ∈ traces(Q)}. Rule 6. Parallel composition. Let P and Q be two sequential processes that evolve concurrently and let their alphabets have empty intersection. The parallel composition P Q is a compound process whose behaviour is described by all the possible interleavings of the traces of P and Q:
ALGORITHM 4.6(a).
1. Translate the trace closure sets of P and Q in isolation (by means of Rules 1 to 4). 2. Remove the initial marking from the equivalent net of P and Q. 3. Add a subnet consisting of a dummy transition and its input place. 4. Draw two arcs so that the dummy transition becomes the input transition of the initial place of both the equivalent nets of P and Q. 5. Define the initial marking by positioning one token in the added place. Figure 7 shows an example of the application of Rule 6, Algorithm 4.6(a) to two unbounded processes.
In Figure 7 the processes P and Q can unwind at different rates. In order to model the situation where the parallel processes are unbounded and synchronize with each other, we must impose the condition that they have a common ending event. So we must modify Algorithm 4.6(a) as follows. Steps 1 to 5 are the same, they are reported for clarity's sake: ALGORITHM 4.6(b) (Unbounded processes only).
1. Translate the trace closure sets of P and Q in isolation (by means of Rules 1 to 4). 2. Remove the initial marking from both the equivalent net of P and Q. -delete the outgoing arcs from the final place.
-add an arc from the new dummy transition to the added initial place. Figure 8 shows the net modelling the synchronized parallel composition of the processes P and Q in Figure 7 .
Rule 7. Interaction. Let P and Q be two sequential processes that evolve concurrently and let their alphabets have a non-empty intersection with α P = α Q. According to Hoare's theory the events that are in both the alphabets require the simultaneous participation of P and Q. The trace set of the compound process P Q is given by the interleaving of the traces of P with the traces of Q, where the common events are considered only once. The composition algorithm on the PN subnets works in the following steps:
ALGORITHM 4.7.
1. Apply Rule 6 to the PN subnets of P and Q. 2. Perform a join operation on the common subnets by superposing all the transitions representing events which are common to P and Q and their input and output places, exception made for:
-the input places of the first common transition -the output places of the last common transition which are not leaf places (ending states). Figure 9a shows the parallel composition of interacting processes by applying Rule 7. Synchronous communication is a particular case of interaction. The semantics of a synchronous communication between two processes is modelled in terms of PNs by 'collapsing' the transitions associated with two corresponding communication events (send and receive) into a single one [9, 18] . Thus the join of the subnets is performed just over the communication events. A naming convention has to be adopted for corresponding communication transitions, in order to enable an automatic tool (such as the PN linker) to recognize them easily. Communication between two processes is represented in Figure 9b .
Rule 8. Alternative processes.
Suppose that P and Q are alternatives, i.e. the compound process behaves as either P or Q. We need a further rule to correctly translate this situation: ALGORITHM 4.8.
Translate the trace closure sets of P and Q in isolation
(by means of Rules 1 to 4). 2. Remove the initial marking of both the equivalent nets of P and Q. 3. Add a subnet consisting of two dummy transitions and one input place. 4. Draw two arcs from the added place respectively to one of the dummy transitions. 5. Draw two arcs, one for each dummy transition, to one of the starting places of the PN subnets. 6. Define the initial marking by posing one token in the added place. Figure 10 shows an application of Rule 8.
Problems arise when alternative processes and/or nondeterministic choice are combined with communication. In these cases constraints must be imposed in order to represent the correct behaviour of the system: for brevity we do not describe them here.
The composition rules can also be iteratively applied to integrate different compound processes. In this case each PN representing a compound process is considered as if it were the PN translation of a CSP process and the first step of the rules (translation of the trace closure of the processes) is not performed.
Of course this is possible because the composition rules refer to the PN representation of the trace closures and not to the trace sets as the translation rules do. Figure 11 shows an example of parallel composition of two compound processes obtained by means of Rule 7. Indeed the two compound processes need to be integrated over a common subprocess which is represented by the shaded subnets.
EXTERNAL ASSUMPTIONS

Classes of constraints
The set of feasible traces for the whole system is determined by the internal and external assumptions which express constraints on the (sequence of) states of the processes. The internal assumptions impose restrictions on the set of legal traces of a process. The external assumptions describe the dependencies of the state of a process (i.e. of a component) on the state of other processes.
The constraints are not always formally expressed by means of Hoare's trace logic. The external assumptions which express purely logical constraints (such as precedence or mutual exclusion constraints) could be introduced in the CSP specifications, whereas the external assumptions involving the concept of simultaneity or overlapping in time of states and events cannot be specified through an untimed logic.
In both cases, we prefer to introduce external assumptions on the PN, in the fourth step of the method, because this can be easily done using well-known concepts of the PN formalism (see later, Subsections 5.2 to 5.4). We have identified the following classes of constraints from which the external assumptions are derived:
• precedence constraints; • resource contention constraints; • inhibition constraints; • activation/reactivation constraints.
Below is a brief description and an example for each case, in order to show how the related assumption affects the PN model of the system.
Precedence constraints
These constraints correspond to external assumptions which define a precedence order on two events of two concurrent processes P and Q. In terms of PNs, this involves adding a place (interlock, see [17] ) between the two events, as shown in Figure 12 , in which transition e3 can fire only after the firing of transition e1.
Interlocks can also be used to extend the model to the case of asynchronous communications. Indeed, they can be expressed by means of a precedence constraint between the send event and its related receive event. In this case the place represents a buffer in which the messages are stored and it must be k-bounded. 
Resource contention constraints
These constraints correspond to external assumptions which define the rules on the concurrent access to shared resources. We focus on a simple example that can be described by critical regions. In terms of PNs, it involves adding a k-bounded place modelling the critical region that has to be accessed in mutual exclusion by a finite number of processes, as shown in Figure 13 , where the marked place represents the resource shared by the processes P and Q.
Inhibition constraints
These constraints correspond to external assumptions which define the restrictions on the evolution of a process P, depending on the current state of some other process Q. This is the class of constraints involving the concept of simultaneity or overlapping in time of the states.
A common situation, for instance, is a requirement stating that if Q is in the state S, an event of P cannot occur until Q has left state S. In terms of PNs, this situation is modelled by an inhibitor arc. In Figure 14 an inhibitor arc between the state s4 and the event e1 prevents the occurrence of e1 (i.e. P cannot be in the state s2) while Q is in the state s4.
Activation/reactivation constraints
Activation describes the situation in which a process Q can evolve only after a process P has reached a particular state S. In Figure 15a this constraint is modelled by the arc from the place s3 to the transition e.
Reactivation describes the situation in which a further activation of a process P is only due to the occurrence of a given event involving a process Q. In Figure 15b this constraint is modelled by the arc from the transition e to the place s1.
CASE STUDY
In the following section the application of the method is described step by step, according to the five phases presented in Section 3. Throughout the remainder of the paper, in the main text the event names are quoted and the state names are in italics.
Informal system description
To describe the application of the method, we have chosen a real-word case study introduced in [19] . The problem belongs to the class of the safety-critical systems. It is an unmanned transportation system, endowed with a collisionprevention control system (global controller). We report below the part of the informal description related to the interactions between an unmanned train and the global controller.
'The whole track covered by a train is divided into blocks. In each block a subsystem that implements control loops (called for simplicity 'loops'), receives an activation signal from the anti-collision antenna located on the train and enables a global controller to determine the train position in the blocks. An infrared barrier is provided on the block that delivers a low pulse as the train crosses it. The antenna of the train is subject to failures, whereas the loops, the infrared barrier and the global controller are supposed to be safe. If the antenna fails while the train is entering the block, the control process must detect the failure and an alarm must be activated.
There are three loops and one infrared barrier for each block (Figure 16) Figure 16 ).'
The requirement on the system actually is that a failure must be detected if the antenna fails while the train is entering and crossing the block.
From the system functional description we derive the list of events, states and assumptions on the system components. This is the first step of the proposed method (see Section 3).
Events and states
The system is described by six interacting processes: the train, considered as a single entity along with the anticollision antenna (TR), the three loops (L1, L2, L3), the infrared barrier (IB) and the collision-prevention control system (CP).
For each process we derive the list of events in which it is involved (listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3) and the list of its states during system evolution (listed and described in Tables 4,  5 and 6). The formalism used in the state tables will be explained in Subsection 6.2. 
Constraints
The global evolution of the process from its initial state to its final state, i.e. the feasible sequences of events, is determined by those constraints from which internal assumptions are derived. They state the order of events for each sequence. Table 7 lists and describes the internal assumptions of the global controller. The external assumptions are derived from the following constraints:
ext1 The event 'eCP2' (control process) may not occur before the event 'eIB2' (barrier). ext2 The control process may not be in the state sCP4 if loop L1 is in the state sL11. 
Going to pass through the infrared barrier (inside stretch2) s ∈ {eTR17, eTR9} sTR3 stretch3 Entering in the block (inside stretch3) s ∈ {eTR15} sTR4 stretch4 Going into the block (inside stretch4) s ∈ {eTR10, eTR18} sTR5 stretch5 Passing through the block (inside stretch5) s ∈ {eTR16} sTR6 stretch6 Approaching the end of the block (inside stretch6) s ∈ {eTR12, eTR20} sTR7 stretch7 Going out of the block (inside stretch7
relIB Passing the infrared barrier s ∈ {eTR4} sTR17 endblock Outside the block s ∈ {eTR14, eTR22} ext3 The control process may not be in the state sCP5 if loop L1 is in the state sL12. ext4 The train may not pass into the state sTR6 through the event 'eTR20' if loop L1 is in the state sL11. ext5 The train may not pass into the state sTR8 through the event 'eTR21' if loop L2 is in the state sL21. ext6 The train may not pass into the state sTR17 through the event 'eTR22' if loop L3 is in the state sL31.
The first constraint is a precedence constraint, while constraints 2 to 6 impose the non-simultaneity of some specific states of different processes.
Timing information
The events having a non-null duration are the events of the TR process from 'eTR1' to 'eTR8' and the event 'eCP4' of the process CP. Indeed these durations represent the crossing times of the single stretches of the block and the ring time of the alarm signal, respectively. The crossing times are a function of the related stretch size and train speed, whereas the ring time is fixed.
The remaining events are supposed to be instantaneous.
Trace-based specifications
In the second step of the method, the set of CSP specifications is derived from the informal description. The first task is to determine the alphabet of events for each process. The names of the events are listed in the second column of the event tables. Thus the alphabets of the processes TR, L1, L2, L3, IB and CP are the following:
αT R = {cross1, cross2, cross3, cross4, cross5, cross6, cross7, cross8, actL1, actL2, actL3, deactL1, deactL2, deactL3, insideIB, outsideIB, failL1, failL2, failL3, relfailL1, relfailL2, relFailL3} αL1 = {actL1, deactL1} αL2 = {actL2, deactL2} αL3 = {actL3, deactL3} α I B = {insideIB, outsideIB, pulsing} αC P = {pulsing, outside, fail, alarm, nofail, reset}. The occurrence of the same event in more than one alphabet means that a number of different processes are involved in that event.
In the following, for brevity's sake, we restrict our attention to the global controller component (CP).
The definition of the states must be expressed by means of predicates that determine for each state S of the process P the subset L s (P) of its alphabet whose events cause the transition of P into S.
For instance, the state sCP5 of the global controller, named back, can be reached if a sequence of events occurs, whose last event is either 'eCP5' or 'eCP6', named 'nofail and 'reset' respectively. So we have L back (CP) ≡ {'eCP5', 'eCP6'}; thus CP is into the state sCP5 iff s ∈ {'eCP5', 'eCP6'}, where s is the current trace of CP (Table 6) .
For each entry in the state tables the related formal state definition must be expressed in this form.
The internal assumptions define the feasibility set of the traces for a given process P. In this step they are formalized as assumptions that are logical expressions.
For example, if on and off are two consecutive states of CP, this implies that the events in L on (CP) must eventually occur before the events in L off (CP). In other words CP enters into the state sCP3 (off) iff the current trace of CP deprived of its last event belongs to the subset of traces which lead the process to the state sCP4 (on). Formally (see Table 7 ):
where s is the last event of the current trace s; s denotes the trace s deprived of its last event and sCP4(s ) means that sCP4 is the actual state of CP after the sequence of events s .
For each entry in the internal assumption tables the related formal definition must be expressed in this form.
Now we can generate the set of legal traces for each process. L1, L2, L3, IB and CP are unbounded recursive processes. The traces of CP from its initial state back to the subsequent initial state are as follows:
1. 2. eCP1 3. eCP1, eCP3 4. eCP1, eCP5 5. eCP1, eCP3, eCP4 6. eCP1, eCP5, eCP2 7. eCP1, eCP3, eCP4, eCP6 8. eCP1, eCP3, eCP4, eCP6, eCP2 .
We now explain how they are automatically built by means of the formal definitions in Tables 3, 5 and 7 . We refer to traces 1 to 4.
• Trace 1.
Initially the component behaviour is represented by the empty trace.
• Trace 2. Look for the empty trace among the formal definitions of the states in Table 6 . The related state is sCP1 (home), thus it is the initial state of the CP process. Look for each occurrence of sCP1 among the formal definitions of the internal assumptions in Table 7 . It occurs just once. The related predicate says that 'eCP1' is the event which causes the transition of the process into the next state. Thus 'eCP1' is the first event in which CP is involved.
• Traces 3 and 4. 'eCP1' is the first event of each trace.
Look for 'eCP1' among the formal definitions of the state 
Assumption ID Description and formal definition intCP1
CP is in the state sCP1 (home) iff it has just been actived or the previous state was sCP5 (back)
CP is in the state sCP2 (check) iff the previous state was sCP1 (home)
CP is in the state sCP3 (off) iff the previous state was sCP4 (on)
CP is in the state sCP4 (on) iff the previous state was sCP2 (check)
CP is in the state sCP5 (back) iff the previous state was sCP2 (check) or the previous state was sCP3(off)
the next event may be 'eCP3' (fail) and intCP5 says that it may be 'eCP5' (nofail). This behaviour is nondeterministic. In the first case we have trace 3, whereas in the second one we have trace 4.
Traces 6 and 8 are the basic traces of CP, as they describe the process behaviour from its initial state to the state sCP5 (back) from which CP comes back to the initial state, thus the trace closure of CP is:
That is to say, by using the event labels:
∝traces(CP) = { pulsing, nofail, outside * , pulsing, fail, alarm, reset, outside * },
where End(CP) = {outside}. The trace closures of L1, L2, L3, IB, by using the event labels, are as follows:
∝traces(TR) consists of 2 6 basic traces since at this stage the pairs of events such as ('actL1', 'deactL1') and ('failL1', 'relfailL1') are not correlated. An example of a basic trace of TR is: cross1, actL1, cross2, insideIB, cross3, failL2, cross4, outsideIB, cross5, deactL1, cross6, actL3, cross7, relfailL2, cross8, deactL3 .
The external assumptions ext4, ext5 and ext6, coming from the constraints that will be imposed later restrict this set to 2 3 combinations corresponding to the different possibilities of failure in the three loops.
Domain transformation
The aim of the last three steps of the method is to pass from the CSP domain to the (stochastic) PN domain. Figure 17 shows the PNs corresponding to the sets of traces of the system processes. The nets have been obtained by applying the translation rules 1, 2 and 3 (sequence, recursion and choice, respectively). We recall that states are represented by places and events by transitions. Let us describe the domain transformation for the process CP.
The trace closure set consists of two possible basic sequences of an unbounded recursion. They identify two branches of a choice whose branching events are 'fail' and 'nofail'.
Rule 3 is applied.
One of the branches contains the event 'fail' and the simple sequence 'alarm', 'reset', 'outside' , whereas the other branch contains only the event 'outside'.
'Outside' is the final event of both the basic sequences, so the condition described in step 6 of Rule 3 is verified and the two branches are joined on it, so that the state 'back' can be reached through both the events 'nofail' and 'reset'. Moreover, 'outside' is also the ending event used by Rule 2 to perform the cyclic closure of the subnet. As the state transition sequences are known from the internal assumptions, we can give the right meaning to each place. The names of the places are the state names listed in Table 6 and the names of the transitions are the event names listed in Table 3 .
The resulting equivalent PN specification of the process CP is shown in Figure 17f. 
Integration
The fourth step is the composition of the pairs of processes according to the rules defined in Subsection 4.3. In this case the common events are synchronization events and signals. The integration is accomplished by applying Rule 6 Algorithm 4.6(a) for the composition of concurrent processes and Rule 7 for the synchronous communications.
The CP process must be composed with the IB process on the common event 'pulsing' which is a signal event. The IB process must be composed in turn with the train process TR on all their common synchronization events (i.e. 'insideIB' and 'outsideIB' ). The same holds for the loop processes that must be composed with the TR process.
After the first linking phase, the resulting net must be modified by introducing the external assumptions (Section 5). The first one requires an interlock between the events (i.e. transitions) 'outsideIB' (TR) and 'outside' (CP).
The second and third assumptions require that two inhibitor arcs are added from the places notL1 and L1 to the transitions 'fail' and 'nofail' (CP) respectively. Finally the external assumptions 4, 5 and 6 require that three inhibitor arcs are added from the places L1, L2 and L3 to the transitions 'relfailL1', 'relfailL2' and 'relfailL3' (TR) respectively.
Temporization and analysis
The application of a structured approach allows us to derive the model of Figure 18 in an unambiguous and correct manner from the initial informal description. It can be used in two ways according to the analysis we are interested in and the metrics we want to define: (a) a qualitative analysis, which can be performed starting from the reachability graph of the net and the other structural properties, (b) a quantitative analysis, which can be performed if the net is extended in order to obtain a timed PN. The last issue requires a further step in our approach, namely the temporization of the PN skeleton.
In our case study we are looking for identifying states which eventually violate the safety requirement of the system. The reachability graph analysis of the net proves that an unsafe state exists, since the train may cross the main segment (stretch6) while there is a failure.
Indeed, the global controller checks the train behaviour in the stretches under the infrared barrier, hence the alarm rings only if the antenna has failed when the train enters a block, whereas the fail cannot be detected if it occurs while the train is crossing a block. The net marking defined by: 2 (#stretch6 = 1, #notIB = 1, #notL1 = 1, #notL2 = 1, #notL3 = 1, #home = 1), means that the train is crossing the stretch6, the loop L2 is not active and the alarm is off: thus the antenna failed while the train was crossing the stretch3 and the failure has not been detected. This is intrinsic in the problem behaviour, so it is correct that this unsafe state can be reached through a feasible sequence of firings, but it is important to check by means of quantitative analysis that its probability (risk) is very low.
Hence the PN skeleton is supplemented with quantitative parameters, according to the initial requirements, thus yielding the final stochastic PN model of the system. We adopt a GreatSPN (GSPN) model, assuming that the timing parameters are random variables with exponential distribution. The subnet representing the TR process has been made recursive by adding a transition 'next' (and the related arcs) between the final and starting places (endblock and stretch1). Transitions modelling time-consuming events have been replaced with timed transitions. Figure 18 shows the final GSPN model which is an executable specification of the whole system.
We have used the GSPN tool [20] to evaluate the quantitative indices defined on the net by solving the underlying isomorphic Markov chain. Since the experiments show that the risk value does not vary with the train speed, Table 8 reports the results obtained by varying the failure 2 #K denotes the marking of the place K. frequency of the antenna (Pfail = failures/hours) and the length of the block (Bsize). The results show that:
1. the risk increases as the length of the block increases; 2. the risk is linear in the failure frequency; 3. the risk has a meaningful growth when the length of the block varies from 1 to 10 km, whereas it increases very little if the length increases any further.
The last point means that it would be better to keep the length of the block near to 1 km between two infrared barriers.
Meaningful results in predictive performance evaluation and/or dependability analysis have been obtained for more complex real systems in cooperation with an industrial partner [3, 4] , but their discussion is beyond the aims of this work.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a structured approach to the formal specification of dependable concurrent systems, based on the transformation of a trace-based specification of CSP processes into PNs. The approach integrates these two different but complementary specification techniques, aiming mainly at the following goals:
• to provide guidelines to extract a trace-based specification from an informal, event-based description of the system requirements, which consists of system events, states, and logical and timing constraints; • to combine the power of the event traces concepts for an intuitive creation of a system description, with the advantages of the analysability and executability of the PN specification; • to hide from the designer many technical and complex aspects of moving from the traces domain to the net domain (by automating the transformation steps); • to increase the level of confidence in the net model, as it is expected to be closer to the real system (provided that the requirements have been correctly and completely expressed) than a hand-made derivation of a PN specification (which is an error-prone task).
A further relevant feature of the proposed approach is compositionality: the complexity of the task of a hand-made construction of the model is avoided by making it possible to specify separately and intuitively (by means of event traces) the behaviour of each system component, as well as the interactions between them by means of the introduction of the external assumptions: the separate CSP specifications are composed by applying a set of rules that produce a PN representation of the whole system, to be used in the simulation and analysis phases.
Our method also checks whether the initial requirements of a system are consistent through the analysis of its resulting net model. This allows detection of errors in the early stages of the development process.
This paper is specifically focused on the algorithmic transformation of the CSP specifications into a PN, and shows its application to a non-trivial case study.
The approach has been defined in the framework of a long-term project with an industrial partner, focused on design techniques for safety-critical software for automated transportation systems. It has proved very effective in the specification and validation of a complex real railway system, similar to the case study we have presented.
